Free movement of persons and migration: report of the hearing held on 21st January, 2016 by unknown
1LSE Commission on the Future of Britain in Europe  |
X xxxx
European
Institute
Rapporteurs:
Eiko Thielemann (LSE) Daniel Schade (LSE)
Free Movement of  
Persons and Migration 
Report of the hearing held on 21st January, 2016
LSE Commission on the Future of Britain in Europe
2 |  Free Movement of Persons & Migration
This is the report on the fourth hearing of the LSE Commission on the Future of Britain in 
Europe which focused on the Freedom of Movement and Immigration and took place on 
Tuesday, February 23rd 2016.
Participants were invited not for their views on the referendum itself, but for their 
expertise in the realm of the EU’s Freedom of Movement policies. The attendees who 
ultimately joined us for the hearing were academics, policy-makers and activists.
We are extremely grateful for their attendance at the meeting, the lively debate that 
ensued and their useful comments on a draft version of this report. We would also 
like to thank those involved in the project at the LSE; particularly David Spence for his 
thorough comments on draft versions of this report, as well as Marion Osborne for her 
administrative support. All remaining errors in this report remain ours.
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1. Introduction
The topic of this hearing was the EU’s freedom of movement rules and the role they  
play in the discussions surrounding the United Kingdom’s upcoming EU referendum. 
The hearing was therefore concerned with the impact of these provisions both on the 
European Union itself, and on individual member states, focusing particularly on the 
effects on the United Kingdom.
The EU’s freedom of movement policies have moved up political agendas across Europe 
ever since the enlargement of the EU to Central and Eastern European countries in 2004 
and 2007 brought in a number of countries that were at significantly lower levels of socio-
economic development than those that had previously become members. The growth in 
labour market opportunities in different member states has meant that more EU citizens 
have made use of their right to freedom of movement since the year 2000 than previously, 
with countries like Germany and the UK being the most popular destinations.
However, during the hearing it became clear that the debate about freedom of movement 
should not be limited to intra-EU migration. For many participants this policy area is part 
of a broader debate on the costs and benefits of the EU’s Single Market. Nonetheless, 
while some contributors at the hearing suggested that “accepting freedom of movement 
is the cost of doing business with the EU”, others cautioned that the national perspective 
was equally important.
Such considerations are particularly relevant since polling data suggest that migration 
is one of the core issues for voters in the UK1. While the referendum campaigns have 
turned to wider debates about the costs and benefits of EU membership, the way in which 
the migration-related outcomes of the government’s renegotiation package are being 
discussed could still have a significant influence on the outcome.
Overall, a disparity remains, on the one hand, between the negative public perceptions of 
the effects of migration, and, on the other, the more nuanced impression given by much of 
the available academic data, which suggests that effects are either negligible or positive. 
A number of reasons for this gap were suggested, mainly depending on the perspective 
adopted. Assessments may vary according to whether the economic, social or cultural 
effects of the EU’s freedom of movement policies are being considered, and whether the 
approach is based on an analysis at state level or at the level of groups of individuals.
In order to capture the range of discussions that took place during the Hearing, the 
remainder of this report is structured as follows: the first section outlines the costs 
and benefits of freedom of movement from different perspectives, while pointing to 
difficulties in providing accurate data on these developments; the second section discusses 
a variety of responses to the perceived problem of EU migration to the UK, and the effect 
they are likely to have on the outcome of the referendum; thirdly, the report weighs up 
the evidence submitted by the participants.
1 According to YouGov issues trackers.
2.  Summary
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•  Free movement of labour was one of 
the founding principles of the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic 
Community in 1957, but in the context 
of the UK referendum it has become 
contentious. 
•  In the absence of precise and reliable 
data, establishing the true impact of the 
provisions for freedom of movement 
on the level of migration since the UK 
joined the European Communities in 
1973 is difficult.
•  Assessment of costs and benefits 
depends largely on whether effects 
are considered on the EU as a whole, 
on individual member states, or on 
particular socio-economic groups within 
a state.
•  There is strong evidence for overall 
positive economic impact of intra-EU 
labour migration for both the EU and 
the UK.
•  However, UK wages may be held down 
by EU immigration, particularly in lower 
income unskilled sectors.
•  The effect of free movement on the 
provision of public services in the UK 
is relatively small, as the majority of 
intra-EU migrants come to the UK to 
seek employment, are not accompanied 
by family members, have generally 
completed their education and are not 
acting as welfare tourists. 
•  But: the nature of the design and 
funding arrangements of the British 
welfare system means certain 
restrictions on benefits, recognised 
under EU law, are more difficult to 
implement in the UK.
•  The migration-related contents of 
the Government’s package were said 
to contain important elements that 
might address some of the concerns of 
the general public about the negative 
impact of EU migration.
•  The UK Government was seeking: 
 -  firstly, a reform of the benefits 
system to prevent access by migrants 
to in-work benefits until they had 
been resident in the UK for a certain 
number of years;
 -  secondly, to avoid the exportation of 
child benefit to the migrant’s country 
of origin. 
•  Participants at the Hearing doubted 
that the reform package would have 
a significant impact on levels of EU 
migration to the UK, and concluded 
that the main pull factor to the UK was 
its strong and open economy. 
•  Brexit (and even leaving the Single 
Market) is unlikely to deliver the kind of 
immigration cuts that some proponents 
of leave would like to see. 
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3  Costs and benefits of the free movement  
of persons: A matter of perspective
The discussions during the Hearing 
highlighted some of the difficulties 
involved in evaluating the costs and 
benefits of the EU’s free movement 
regime, starting with the issues raised by 
data collection. This was followed by a 
discussion on the costs and benefits of EU 
freedom of movement rules from three 
different perspectives: first, that of the 
EU as a whole; second, that of individual 
European citizens, and third that of 
member states, focusing on the effect on 
the United Kingdom in particular.
3.1 The availability of reliable data
The discussion quickly revealed a major 
problem in any discussion of the effects 
of the EU’s freedom of movement 
policies, namely the inherent difficulty of 
gathering accurate migration data. The 
importance of establishing even the most 
basic facts was recently highlighted when 
the UK government published statistics 
on the take up of welfare benefits by EU 
migrants, which were subsequently called 
into question by the government’s own 
statistical watchdog.2
The first problem in establishing accurate 
data on migration (and its impact) 
concerns the challenge of being able to 
distinguish between permanent migration 
patterns and shorter-term mobility. 
Moreover, one of the main sources of 
data for EU migration to the UK, for 
instance, is the Office of National Statistics’ 
estimates derived from the International 
Passenger Survey, figures which fail to 
capture accurately the intentions of people 
crossing the UK’s borders and to record 
their length of stay.
As some participants pointed out, this 
makes it difficult to assess how many EU 
migrants have settled permanently in the 
UK and, consequently, what their impact 
is on the UK’s labour market and public 
services. While some academic studies have 
tried to provide more accurate data3, the 
availability of reliable up-to-date statistics 
remains a critical problem. However, even 
with better data, disagreements would 
remain as to the appropriate level of 
analysis when evaluating the costs and 
benefits of migration. 
3.2 Cost-benefit perspectives:  
The EU as a whole
For some participants, the EU’s freedom 
of movement provisions are as much an 
economic concept as they are a symbol of 
what the EU represents. They therefore set 
the current situation regarding freedom of 
movement within a wider context, arguing 
that it has been a core feature of European 
integration (albeit in a weaker form) ever 
since the foundation of the European 
Economic Community.
While earlier flows were significantly 
lower than today, participants nevertheless 
pointed out that Germany, for example, 
received relatively large numbers of 
migrants from Greece and Spain when they 
joined the European Communities in 1981 
and 1986 respectively. It was also pointed 
out that the reforms leading to the 
current iteration of the right to freedom 
of movement, as established with the 
2  The Independent, ‘David Cameron’s EU migrant benefits figures blasted by UK Statistics Authority watchdog’,  
11 November 2015.
3  C. Dustmann, T. Frattini and C. Halls (2010): “Assessing the Fiscal Costs and Benefits of A8 Migration to the UK”,  
Fiscal Studies 31 (1), pp. 1-41.
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Treaty of Maastricht, were actually based 
on concerns during the 1980s that intra-
European mobility was too low.
From an economic perspective, some 
participants suggested that freedom 
of movement of persons is a necessary 
corollary to a functioning single 
market, which in turn has positive socio-
economic effects for the EU as a whole. 
If governments are interested in reaping 
the full economic benefits arising from the 
free flow of goods, capital and services, 
then the benefits can only accrue if the 
flow is accompanied by the free movement 
of persons. It was stressed that a change 
to one of these four components would 
necessarily have negative consequences on 
the others.
While not all EU economies have 
benefitted equally from the Single Market, 
it is widely agreed that the integration of 
less developed countries into the single 
market has not only created economic 
benefits for the countries in question, but 
for the EU as a whole.
Several participants cautioned, however, 
that reducing EU migration to a purely 
economic dimension would not do justice 
to the European project itself. The EU’s 
concept of freedom of movement serves 
as an important symbol for individual 
freedoms in Europe, even at times when 
the economic benefits are not immediately 
obvious. As one participant pointed out, 
freedom of movement is often viewed 
as a basic principle of what it means 
to be a European. It was one of the 
central aspirations of Central and Eastern 
Europeans who were denied this right 
under Communist rule.
3.3 Cost-benefit perspectives: 
European citizens
Comments focusing on the effects that 
freedom of movement have on individual 
European citizens revealed different 
perspectives depending on the category 
of citizen concerned. Just as freedom of 
movement affects different member states 
in different ways, the costs and benefits 
for individual citizens depend on factors 
such as national origin and socio-economic 
status.
While the benefits of the freedom of 
movement are obvious for those who 
have taken up their right to reside in a 
different country, they are less obvious 
for non-mobile individuals. Nonetheless, 
as one participant commented, from 
an economic perspective, freedom of 
movement has positive effects not only for 
migrants, but also for the host country. 
While the latter effect is relatively limited 
when broken down at individual level, the 
impact over the life course is significant for 
individual migrants. These surplus benefits 
are internalised in the EU, increasing the 
average level of wellbeing of every EU 
citizen. In addition, it was pointed out 
that the mere possibility of EU-internal 
migration serves as an insurance policy 
when individual EU economies suffer 
from recession, allowing workers to seek 
employment elsewhere.
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3.4 Cost-benefit perspectives: 
member states
While intra-EU migration operates from 
and to all EU countries, a distinction can 
nonetheless be made between the effects 
on two broad categories of member states: 
namely the countries of origin (migrant-
sending countries) and migrant-receiving 
countries. The effects on the latter group 
also depend largely on the kind of EU 
migrants they receive.
3.4.1 Countries of origin
While there are concerns that emigration 
may lead to a “brain drain” and a 
worsening of the demographic outlook, 
the effects on the countries of origin 
were generally viewed as very positive 
by the participants at the Hearing. This is 
primarily due to the payment of financial 
remittances by migrants back to their 
home countries. Simultaneously large-scale 
emigration creates incentives for political 
and economic reform. One participant 
supported this argument by citing the 
example of the long-term positive effects 
of the Irish brain drain during the 1980s on 
the country itself.
By contrast, some participants cautioned 
that large-scale emigration from Europe’s 
Eastern and Southern member states 
contributes to a loss of workers who 
would be capable of injecting economic 
dynamism into the economies of their 
countries of origin. In their opinion, the 
positive effects associated with freedom of 
movement can eventually become negative 
if too many citizens decide to settle abroad 
permanently instead of making only short-
term use of the ability to work, live and 
study abroad.
One participant illustrated the positive 
effects of freedom of movement in the 
case of Poland. While there has been 
large-scale emigration of skilled Polish 
workers, little evidence is found that 
this emigration has led to major labour 
market shortages (with the possible 
exception of the information technology 
sector). Nonetheless, some concerns were 
expressed as to the potential negative 
demographic effects on sending countries’ 
pension systems. 
3.4.2 Receiving countries
Comments about the effects on recipient 
countries offered insights into both 
general costs and benefits of receiving 
EU migrants, and the effects on specific 
member states, and particularly on the UK.
A number of participants argued that 
destination countries benefit from 
receiving migrants in a variety of ways: due 
to their contributions to national budgets, 
the introduction of new skills into the 
labour market, by dampening the effects 
There is strong evidence for 
overall positive economic 
impact of intra-EU labour 
migration for both the EU  
and the UK
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of ageing populations in the host countries 
or more broadly in cultural terms.
Participants also pointed to the fact that 
the UK is not the only recipient country for 
EU migrants, with various member states 
receiving different kinds of migrants. In 
that context, Spain and Portugal were 
cited as examples of countries receiving 
a high proportion of retired elderly EU 
migrants (including significant numbers 
from the UK). 
Participants offered a variety of insights 
into both the costs and benefits of EU 
migration to the UK. Despite the many 
positive economic effects reported in 
the discussion, a significant increase in 
EU immigration to the UK since the EU’s 
enlargement to the East in 2004 and 2007 
has raised some concerns. However, most 
participants agreed that a large part of  
EU migration to the UK was demand-
driven and due to the dynamism of the 
UK’s economy.
Generally speaking, the EU’s freedom 
of movement rules have provided UK 
businesses with a steady supply of workers, 
be they highly specialized or low-skilled. 
With regard to the economic impact of 
EU migration on the UK, reference was 
made to a study outlining an overall fiscal 
benefit to the UK’s public finances as a 
result of intra-EU migration4. 
While the effects on the UK’s economy 
appear to be largely positive overall, some 
participants also referred to a recent study5 
showing that high levels of immigration to 
the UK have the potential to hold down 
UK wages, creating particularly high risks 
for workers in the low-skilled and semi-
skilled sectors. Moreover, some participants 
highlighted concerns about the impact 
of migration on public services, as well as 
social cohesion within communities.
Several participants noted that EU 
migrants arriving in the UK tend to be 
young, they have received their education 
4  C. Dustmann and T. Frattini (2014): “The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK”, The Economic Journal 124 (580),  
pp. F593-F643.
5  S. Nickell and J. Saleheen (2015): The impact of of immigration on occupational wages: Evidence from Britain,  
Staff Working Paper No. 574, London: Bank of England.
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abroad and often have not yet formed 
families. This creates significant benefits 
for the UK, as the country is receiving 
the benefits from skills acquired abroad 
without having to pay for them. Moreover, 
young people tend to make less use of 
the National Health Service. However, 
participants did point out that, when 
migrants settle more permanently and 
form families, these dynamics may be 
expected to change. While they are likely 
to pay more taxes as they integrate further 
into labour markets, public expenditure  
on education and healthcare is expected  
to rise. 
Moreover, a growing population does 
have wider effects on the housing market 
and on the provision of public services. 
As noted by one participant, the impact 
of migration also depends on the ease of 
scalability and adaptability of different 
services, to a changing population.  
Overall, the problem of accurately 
estimating migration levels and patterns 
makes it difficult for planners to alter the 
provision of services rapidly, in particular  
in cases where important capital costs 
arise, as for housing and transportation. 
Several participants countered this 
claim by arguing that the budgets for 
public services in the UK have been cut 
significantly in recent years, even when 
demand has been on the rise, meaning 
that the pressure on public services is felt 
across the UK and not just in areas with 
significant numbers of migrants.
When discussing public concerns about 
the impact of migration on the UK’s social 
services, participants pointed to the fact 
that, where benefits are provided on a 
non-contributory basis, it is difficult under 
EU rules to restrict access selectively for 
individuals, even to those who have not 
contributed to the system. Member states 
based on contributory social security 
systems have managed to curtail access 
to non-contributors while remaining 
compliant with EU legislation, whereas  
tax-funded systems like that in the UK  
have struggled to do so.
Most participants agreed that the costs 
of welfare benefits for EU migrants are 
relatively small. The issue is nonetheless 
significant in terms of public attitudes, 
particularly in the UK. In Ireland for 
example, a country with a similar non-
contributory welfare system, concerns  
over the welfare costs for EU migrants 
have been much more muted and are 
regarded as largely insignificant compared 
to the wider benefits of being a member 
of the EU.
Beyond the economic dimension, a 
number of participants highlighted the 
reputational benefits for the UK due to the 
country’s openness to migration in general, 
and to EU migration from Central and 
Eastern Europe in particular. Finally, some 
participants cautioned against adopting an 
overly short-term perspective on the issue 
of net migration levels since migratory 
patterns can be subject to significant 
changes over time.
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A number of different policy options  
were briefly discussed at the hearing.  
The exchanges demonstrated that there 
are no easy fixes when it comes to 
addressing concerns over immigration  
to the UK.
4.1 Reforming the British  
welfare state
As already noted, the design of the UK’s 
welfare arrangements limits the possibility 
of restricting access to welfare benefits 
for EU migrants. Furthermore, the UK’s 
government is highly centralised, making 
it more difficult to adapt policy planning 
to regionally differentiated demographic 
challenges. Regions in decentralized 
countries like Germany have been able to 
adapt their planning more successfully to 
different intra-EU migration patterns.
While the potential for institutional 
changes in the UK to address these 
challenges and constraints has been 
discussed in the past, most participants  
felt that wide-ranging institutional 
reform was unlikely. Some voiced 
concerns that any fundamental changes 
in response to the challenges associated 
with EU membership would further fuel 
Euroscepticism in the UK.
4.2 Establishing an  
‘emergency brake’
The effectiveness of an emergency brake 
mechanism, as in the negotiation package, 
for the suspension of benefits to EU 
migrants was also discussed at the Hearing. 
While the specifics of this measure were 
unclear at the time of the Hearing,  
many participants had their doubts about 
the effective implementation of such  
a measure.
Some participants suggested that the 
establishment of an emergency brake on 
EU migrants’ access to in-work benefits 
would raise questions about exactly who 
would be able to trigger the measure and 
on what basis. While the deal that has 
been agreed since the Hearing addresses 
this issue by giving ultimate decision-
making power to the European Council, 
the issue of eligibility criteria has not been 
clearly addressed, as the deal simply states 
that the UK would be able to make use of 
the emergency brake mechanism in the 
current circumstances.
The focus of the discussion turned, 
however, on the likely efficacy of the 
measure in bringing down EU-migration 
to the UK. Most of the participants agreed 
that the effect on migration levels was 
likely to be minimal. Some nonetheless 
highlighted the important symbolic effects 
of the measure in addressing public 
concerns about so-called welfare tourism.
4  Assessing policy options: Curing the 
‘problem’ by killing the patient?
the design and funding 
arrangements of the British 
welfare system mean certain 
restrictions on benefits, 
recognised under EU law, are 
more difficult to implement  
in the UK
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4.3 The Brexit scenario
Asked about the viability of Brexit as 
a solution to the perceived problem of 
mass EU migration to the UK, participants 
pointed to many unresolved issues. 
Most felt that Brexit would do little to 
bring about significant change in the 
immigration pull factors that have made 
the UK a popular destination country 
for migrants. Nonetheless, two distinct 
scenarios were discussed in more detail.
While participants agreed that Brexit 
would, in theory, give Britain more control 
over its immigration system, most believed 
that, in practice, control over immigration 
would remain limited. Doubts were cast on 
the capacity of an open economy like that 
of the UK to close its borders. 
Participants also cautioned against seeing 
the EU’s free movement of persons’ 
provisions in isolation, as they are 
intrinsically linked to other aspects of the 
Single Market. If the UK wants to continue 
to benefit from access to that market, 
most considered that it was not feasible 
to assume that the other member states 
would allow Britain to restrict movement 
of EU citizens into the UK unilaterally. 
Asked about solutions that would see 
Britain reorganize its relationship with 
Europe in a similar way to Norway’s EEA 
participation, or Switzerland’s bilateral 
treaties, the consensus was that this would 
not address the perceived problem of 
migration to the UK. 
In the absence of a settlement similar 
to the Norwegian model, participants 
discussed the idea of a points-based  
system as is currently in place in Australia. 
While some participants recognized the 
appeal of such a model, they nevertheless 
pointed to a number of specific difficulties 
that would arise. British businesses are 
expected to oppose a solution that renders 
access to qualified labour more difficult, 
and such a system would be expected to 
generate significant bureaucratic costs. 
Whereas one participant saw the attraction 
of a system that provides preferential 
access to migrants from richer countries, 
others cautioned that such a system would 
create more problems than it would solve.
Some participants also warned that any 
significant change to migration policy 
would radically increase incentives for 
illegal migration, ultimately putting a large 
number of workers at risk of exploitation. 
Finally, it was suggested that significant 
difficulties would arise for Britain’s 
relationship with Ireland if the UK were  
no longer a member of either the EU or 
the European Economic Area (EEA).
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Two broad conclusions emerged from the 
LSE expert Hearing on free movement of 
persons and migration. 
First, the discussions shed some light on the 
question as to why so many disagreements 
remain about the costs and benefits of 
migration. Data on migration remain 
notoriously weak, and analysts will always 
differ in their assessment of the relative 
importance of financial and non-financial 
factors involved. More importantly, the 
Hearing made it clear that, ultimately, 
any assessment usually comes down to the 
question of whose benefits and costs are 
of most concern. 
Second, the meeting highlighted that our 
experts did not believe that the British 
Government’s renegotiation deal will 
prove an effective way to cut immigration 
to the UK. It seems very clear that the 
reasons for immigration to the UK have 
a lot more to do with pull factors created 
by an open and successful British economy 
than with the attractiveness or otherwise 
of Britain’s welfare system. As one of the 
hearing’s participants aptly put it: ‘For  
free market economies, the only effective 
way to reduce immigration is to wreck 
your economy and throw it into recession’. 
If Britain wants to remain an open  
market economy, even a Brexit scenario  
is unlikely to deliver the kind of control 
over immigration that some proponents  
of leave would like to see.
5  Conclusions
the main pull factor to the UK 
is its strong and open economy
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